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Abstract  
This paper examines the impact of political risks on imports in Malaysia.  A wide array of 
indicators for political risk is used to examine their relative importance on imports. The paper 
uses Fully-modified OLS regression technique and the findings reveal that several types of 
indicators namely socio-economic conditions, law and order, religion in politics, democratic 
accountability and bureaucracy quality seem to exert significant impact towards imports in 
Malaysia.  The impact however, is relatively small. An important policy implication is that 
policy makers should account for political risks apart from other institutional risks such as the 
conventional economic and financial risks in the formulation of trade policies.   
 
Keywords: Imports, Political Risks, Fully-modified OLS 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The advent of globalization gives rise to increased financial and trade liberalization in 
emerging markets and developing countries. However, along with globalization, there 
is increasing uncertainty and risks stemming from economic, financial and political 
factors due to the greater interdependence among countries.  More frequent episodes 
of financial crises are among the many facets of the adverse side to globalization.  
 
In Malaysia, more than forty percent of its total imports comprises of intermediate and 
capital goods that are used to fuel production for exports.  Thus, the impact of risks on 
imports would have an indirect consequence on exports. Given that the country‟s 
economic growth has been very much export-led, the effects of risks on imports 
should be of primary concern to international businesses and policymakers. In 
general, a rise in the level of risks is often linked to an increase in overall trading 
costs.  
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Existing studies have generally focused on risks emanating from exchange rate 
fluctuations such as volatility and misalignment to portray the effect of risks on 
international trade. Results from such studies were mixed. Nevertheless, a majority of 
the studies show evidence of negative effects of exchange rate risks on imports. Of 
late, studies began to incorporate the role of institutional and geographical factors to 
further understand the behavior of imports. However, there is a huge concentration of 
study on the impact of these factors on economic growth and foreign direct 
investment (see Arbia, Battisti, and Di Vaio, 2010; Gallo and Dall‟erba, 2006; Olsson 
and Hibbs, 2005; Ramajo, Marquez, Hewings and Salinas, 2008; Strulik, 2008; Busse 
and Hefeker, 2006). The present study makes a significant contribution to the body of 
knowledge in that it specifically focuses on political risks and their impacts on 
Malaysia‟s imports.  To the best of our knowledge, there is no known work that 
examines the role of political risks in influencing imports. 
 
A wide array of indicators for political risk is used to examine their relative 
importance on imports. Twelve elements of political risks were introduced. These 
risks are, as those defined by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) provided 
by the Political Risk Services (PRS) group for countries deemed important in 
international business. Based on the ICRG survey, the political risks elements are 
categorized as Government Stability (GS), Socioeconomic Condition (SC), 
Investment Profile (IP), Internal Conflict (IC), External Conflict (EC), Corruption (C), 
Military in Politics (MP), Religious Tensions (RT), Law and Order (LO), Ethnic 
Tensions (ET), Democratic Accountability (DA), and Bureaucracy Quality (BQ). We 
therefore empirically gauge whether changes in these twelve components of political 
risk increase or decrease imports significantly. The results show how different 
political risk elements have differential effects on imports.  
 
Using the fully modified OLS method, results obtained show that political risk arising 
from socio-economic conditions, law and order, religion in politics, democratic 
accountability, and bureaucracy quality affect imports in the long run. Thus, the 
present study provides initial evidence that political risks do influence imports. The 
rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief discussion 
on some of the existing literature on the subject. In section 3, the differentiated import 
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model based on Flam and Helpman (1987) is discussed. The model is augmented to 
include the effect of political risk on imports. Section 4 summarizes the method used 
to estimate the effect of political risks on imports. Section 5 discusses and interprets 
the results of the empirical analysis. Lastly, section 6 provides some 
recommendations for trade policy-making. 
 
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
As mentioned in the preceding section, a large body of literature has focused on the 
impact of exchange rate risks on imports while there is a dearth of literature on the 
effects of political risks on imports. The studies on exchange rate and imports capture 
risks in terms of volatility and misalignment. The earlier literature focuses on the 
impact of exchange rate volatility on exports and imports (see Kenen and Rodrick, 
1986; Cushman, 1988; Koray and Lastrapes, 1989; and Chowdury, 1993; among 
many others) while more recent literature captures risk in terms of misalignment (see 
Toulaboe, 2006). A range of proxies has been used to capture volatility while several 
models have been developed to establish the real equilibrium exchange rate and 
subsequently, the degree of misalignment. 
 
While there is a lack of studies that examine the impact of political risks on imports, 
there are a growing number of literatures on the effects of political risks on FDI. One 
such study by Busse and Hefeker (2006) which investigates investment flows to 
eighty three developing countries, finds that amongst the twelve indicators of political 
risk based on the ICRG, government stability, absence of internal and ethnic tensions, 
basic democratic rights and ensuring law and order affect FDI inflows positively. 
Clare and Gang (2010) find political stability increases FDI only in developing 
countries.  
 
More recently, Baek and Qian (2011) find political risk significant in both 
industrialized and developing countries. All three studies measure political risk as 
decreasing when the index increases. On the other hand, Jimenez (2011) found 
contradictory results in which FDI flows from Southern European countries appear 
attracted to nearby developing regions such as North African and new European 
Union member states only when there is a greater level of political risk. The risk in 
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his study is measured through scales of political discretion, corruption, and economic 
freedom.  
 
The studies discussed above demonstrate that there is a growing trend of 
incorporating political risk indicators in FDI studies. Nevertheless, the interest on 
imports and political risk nexus is still in its infancy. As barriers to trade fall, 
emerging markets become vulnerable to political risks that are mainly beyond their 
control. The increased presence of political risks would cause foreign transactions to 
be more complex compared to domestic trade. Studies by Anderson and Marcouiller 
(2002) and Meon and Sekkat (2004) as confirmed also by Moser, Nestmann and 
Wedow (2008), exhibit evidence that political risks and low quality institutions hinder 
the involvement of higher risk countries in international trade. Moser et al, however, 
examine the effect of political risk on trade but the focus is on exports.  
 
Even though many businesses identify the influence of political risks as a major risk 
in foreign trade, they merely use „intuition‟ to deal with the potential risks 
(Fitzpatrick, 1983). Thus, the need to have models that are capable of empirical 
evaluation is timely. 
 
3. THEORETICAL MODEL 
The following theoretical discussion uses Flam and Helpman (1987) as the underlying 
model to analyze the impact of risks on imports.  The main objective in this section is 
to theoretically develop an import demand model, which incorporates the impact of 
risk on imports, instead of on an ad-hoc basis.     
 
The utility function of an agent consuming x and y are given by, 
 
  1yx cuU           (1) 
 
where xu  is the sub-utility level obtained through the consumption of various 
differentiated products and yc  represents the consumption of homogenous goods.  
The sub utility function xu  is modeled as a constant elasticity of substitution in the 
form, 
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where      is the elasticity of substitution and 1  so that marginal revenue is 
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shows the consumption of imported product of variety i.   The demand function for 
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where homogenous good is considered the numeraire, 1p y  , ip   is the consumer 
price of domestically produced variety i , fip  is the consumer price of the imported 
variety i , jp  represents the consumer price of foreign variety j and Y is total 
spending of the country proxied by income.  Next, Yi  is spending on the different 
variety of the differentiated goods, x .   
Assuming free trade in y , then 1pp *yy  .  Similarly, the imported foreign 
varieties are equally prices as 1pp
*
ifi  .  Hence, the risks (R) results in the price 
of imported variety as follows: 
 
RpRp ifi  1)1(
*
    for      *n,.....,2,1i       (5)
    
where R captures the impact of risks.  Then, the downward sloping for domestic and 
import demand curve is as follows, 
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Since 1 , 0
R
d
d
fi
  and 0
Y
d
d
fi
   where an increase in income (Y) and risk 
indicator (R) will cause fid  to increase.   
Based on the above discussion, the aggregate import demand has the following 
separable form, 
),,( RiskPYfM                                                                       (10) 
where M denotes real import, Y is real income, P represents import price, and R 
capture the risks. We expect real income to positively affect imports while increase in 
import price to decrease real imports. An increase in the political risk index indicates 
less risk and better institutions (Busse and Hefeker, 2006). Thus, in general, we 
predict all 12 indicators to be positively related to imports as less political risk and 
better institutions generate greater certainty in international trade transactions. This 
would increase imports in the nation.  
 
4. ESTIMATION METHOD  
The theory of time series econometrics model has developed a number of applicable 
methods for the estimation of parameters describing the long run relationships of the 
macroeconomic variables.  Unit root testing and cointegration has long been 
recognized as mechanisms to calculate the parameters of the intended variables.  In 
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general, any long run time series estimation is based on the work of Engle Granger 
(1987) [two-step cointegration], Phillips and Hansen (1990) [Fully Modified OLS], 
Johansen (1991) [multivariate vector error correction model], Stock and Watson 
(1993) [Dynamic OLS] and Pesaran et. al (2001) [Bounds Testing and ARDL 
approach].  This study relies on the fully modified OLS method. 
 
A.   Fully Modified OLS (FM-OLS) 
 
Developed by Phillips and Hansen (1990), FM-OLS offers several advantages.  First, 
it eliminates sample bias.  Second, FM-OLS corrects for serial correlation and 
endogeneity.  Third, FM-OLS is also superior in finite samples in terms of bias and 
mean square error and has been found to have good size and power properties 
(Chambers, 2011).  Since FM-OLS is a single equation linear model, this technique 
should be adopted in the presence of one cointegration vector only and regressors are 
stationary at first differences, I(1).  To conserve space, a brief explanation is provided 
based on Phillips and Loretan (1993) as below. 
 
A single equation method based on OLS is as follows. 
 
t1t2t1 uy'y           (11) 
 
Let *  be the OLS estimator of   in equation (11), where 
 
1
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Written in Phillips (1989) Lemma 3.1, 
 
  122 2.12
'
211 SSS          (14) 
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where the conditional variance of t1u  given t2u  is given by )(BM)r(S 2.112.1   and 
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To correct for serial correlation in 21 , a consistent estimator 21ˆ  for 21  is 
introduced hence the OLS estimator is modified as below.  
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Next, to correct for endogeneity of t2y  in equation (11), the correlations between the 
Brownian motions 1S  and 2S  in equation (15) must be removed by constructing 
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Therefore, the fully modified OLS estimator which corrects for both endogeneity and 
serial correlation is written as 
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  follows the same asymptotic behavior as the full systems of maximum likelihood 
estimation.  Given these corrections, estimation of the long run equilibrium will be 
fully efficient and asymptotically unbiased. 
 
B.      Data and Definition of Variables 
 
Sources of data and definition of variables are as follow.  The data is annual, ranging 
from 1984 to 2011 with 28 observations. 
 
Real Import (I) is Imports deflated using the consumer price index (CPI), producer 
price index (PPI) and GDP deflator.  Results are almost similar, hence, imports 
deflated using CPI is chosen.   Data is obtained from the Department of Statistics and 
the International Financial Statistics (IFS), International Monetary Fund (2012). 
 
Real Income (Y) is calculated based on Malaysia‟s GDP deflated using the GDP 
deflator.  Data on GDP and GDP deflator are obtained from Monthly Bulletin 
Statistics, Bank Negara Malaysia, Economic Planning Unit and Department of 
Statistics, Malaysia respectively.  
 
Prices (P) is proxied by import price.  Data is obtained from the Department of 
Statistics, Malaysia. 
 
Risks (R) capture political risks.  Political risks are as described in section 1.  Data is 
obtained from ICRG, The PRS Group (2012). Each indicator ranges from 0 to 12.  
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Thirteen models were estimated to gauge the influence of different types of political 
risks on Malaysia‟s imports (refer to Panels A and B). In all models, it can be observed 
that real income and import price are consistently significant. Furthermore, the 
coefficient values for each variable do not deviate much across the different models. 
Additionally, they exhibit the expected signs. Based on these results, we can conclude 
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that increases in real income and import price would increase and decrease real 
imports respectively. 
TABLE 1: FM-OLS ESTIMATION – DEPENDENT VARIABLE : IMPORTS (1984-2011) 
Panel A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Y 0.829*** 
(0.0327) 
0.712*** 
(0.052) 
0.723*** 
(0.064) 
0.843*** 
(0.044) 
0.822*** 
(0.062) 
0.945*** 
(0.092) 
1.022*** 
(0.123) 
P -0.649*** 
(0.228) 
-1.364*** 
(0.229) 
-0.982*** 
(0.202) 
-0.717*** 
(0.234) 
-0.772*** 
(0.232) 
-0.824*** 
(0.209) 
-1.483*** 
(0.469*) 
D -0.009 
(0.023) 
-0.013 
(0.026) 
0.001 
(0.038) 
-0.035 
(0.030) 
-0.013 
(0.032) 
-0.031 
(0.032) 
0.010 
(0.031) 
C -0.295 
(0.387) 
0.955 
(0.489) 
0.664 
(0.528) 
-0.478 
(0.568) 
0.012 
(0.710) 
-1.115 
(0.857) 
-0.501 
(0.510) 
GS 0.006 
(0.006) 
- - - - - - 
SEC - 0.042*** 
(0.013) 
- - - - - 
INV - - 0.029 
(0.013) 
- - - - 
IC - - - 0.020 
(0.017) 
- - - 
EC - - - - -0..8 
(0.027) 
- - 
COR - - - - - 0.055 
(0.038) 
- 
RIP - - - - - - -0.115 
(0.068) 
 
Table 1: continued 
Panel B 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Y 0.815*** 
(0.042) 
0.849*** 
(0.071) 
0.822*** 
(0.043) 
0.906*** 
(0.029) 
0.756*** 
(0.073) 
1.351*** 
(0.199) 
P -0.814*** 
(0.199) 
-0.937*** 
(0.377) 
-1.360*** 
(0.416) 
-1.001*** 
(0.135) 
-1.401*** 
(0.249) 
-1.848*** 
(0.508) 
D 0.014 
(0.029) 
-0.006 
(0.032) 
-0.018 
(0.030) 
0.030 
(0.019) 
0.020 
(0.013) 
-0.039 
(0.031) 
C 0.144 
(0.447) 
-0.087 
(0.473) 
0.335 
(0.525) 
-0.053 
(0.277) 
1.209*** 
(0.382) 
-2.808 
(1.083) 
RIP - - - - - -0.170** 
(0.076) 
LO -0.033 
(0.016) 
- - - -0.067*** 
(0.019) 
0.117** 
(0.043) 
ET - -0.009 
(0.025) 
- - 0.0420 
(0.022) 
- 
DA -  0.037 
(0.025) 
- 0.061*** 
(0.015) 
- 
BQ -  - -0.163*** 
(0.022) 
-0.119*** 
(0.025) 
- 
Notes:  *** and ** denote 1% and 5% significance level.  Abbreviations are as follows:  Y - income, P 
– real price, D – crisis dummies, C – constant, GS – government stability, SEC – socio-economic 
conditions, INV – investment profile, IC- internal conflict, EC – external conflict, COR – corruption, 
MIP – military in politics, RIP – religion in politics, LO – law and order, ET – ethnic tension, DA – 
Democratic Accountability and BQ – Bureaucracy Quality.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Noor Zahirah Mohd Sidek / Journal of Emerging Economies and Islamic Research / Vol.1 No.1(2013) 
 
 11 
Of the 7 models estimated in Panel A, only the variable socio-economic conditions 
(SEC) appear to exert a significant positive effect on imports. This means that an 
improvement in the nation‟s socio-economic condition which entails less political risk, 
leads to an increase in imports. In Panel B, religion in politics, law and order, 
democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality are significant. Nevertheless, the 
values of their coefficients tend to be relatively small.  
 
Results demonstrated by law and order variable are mixed as shown in models 12 and 
13. Thus, solid conclusion of the actual effect of law and order on imports cannot be 
proposed and further tests need to be undertaken to ensure robustness of the results. 
The coefficient signs for bureaucracy quality and religion in politics are negative, 
which is counterintuitive. This implies that better condition in bureaucracy quality and 
religious harmony tends to deter imports. This is quite perplexing and worthy of 
extended investigation. As for democratic accountability, the positive sign obtained 
indicates that an improvement in accountability helps reduce economic instability, 
thus providing a more stable international business environment.  
 
7. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
In this paper, an empirical test of the augmented differentiated import model has been 
conducted to provide a preliminary assessment of the impact of political risk on 
imports in Malaysia.  Out of the various components of political risk examined, only 
socio-economic conditions, law and order, religion in politics, democratic 
accountability, and bureaucracy quality have significant impact on imports.  
Furthermore, the coefficients are small inferring relatively low impact.  In addition, 
not all aspects of political risk affect imports in the same way. This study provides 
some preliminary evidence that political risks do have an impact on imports in the 
long run.  Hence, it is recommended that future studies should try to incorporate 
political risks as part of their analysis.  As political risk influences imports, it is 
further recommended that the government reduce red tapes that could lead to a more 
conducive business environment. Socio-economic conditions, law and order, and 
accountability should be improved to further enhance trade. 
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